# Delaware Chancery rules porous information wall, misleading proxy defeat Section 144 safe harbor

Attorney advertising. Brief by Lou Schwartz, Schwartz & Associates, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Published 2026-11-13; updated 2026-11-13. Responsible attorney: Lou Schwartz. Canonical: https://www.snalawyers.com/insights/delaware-chancery-rules-porous-information-wall-misleading-proxy-defea

In Dodiya v. Franklin, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the safe harbors under Sections 144(a)(1) and (a)(2) were unavailable at the motion-to-dismiss stage because it was reasonably conceivable that the board was grossly negligent in failing to maintain an information wall against a conflicted, known leaker and that the stockholder vote on the transaction was materially misinformed. The court clarified that disinterested-director approval alone is necessary but not sufficient for the safe harbor, which also requires good-faith, non-negligent board authorization. The ruling allowed nonexculpated claims to proceed only against the company's CEO and executive chairman.

**Why it matters.** The decision narrows how far boards can rely on Delaware's amended Section 144 safe harbors to shield conflicted transactions from fiduciary-duty claims, a framework relevant to shareholders challenging other insider-conflicted deals.

## Sources

1. [Troutman Pepper Locke](https://www.troutman.com/insights/delaware-court-of-chancery-holds-that-a-porous-information-wall-and-misleading-proxy-defeat-section-144-safe-harbors-at-the-pleading-stage/)

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